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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 It should come as no surprise that lawyers and courtrooms are frequent topics on 
the silver screen. The adversarial nature of trials is inherently dramatic, and that 
nature—pitting one side against another in an effort to expose or obfuscate the 
truth—means that trials are equally suited to both “morality plays,” in which the 
righteous prevail and the guilty are punished, and more complex dramas, in which 
the nature of truth itself is under as much scrutiny as the evidence before the court. 
Lawyers, too, are easy targets for the screenwriter’s and director’s commentary due to 
the multifaceted roles they can play in the legal system: devoted advocate (for good or 
ill), passionate activist, and reluctant hero.
 The portrayal of lawyers in film has changed over time, a transition that has not 
gone unnoticed by scholars.1 Lawyers in Hollywood movies (“movie-lawyers”) made 
in the 1950s and 1960s were almost universally just and moral men,2 even when they 
were on the losing end of their courtroom battle.3 In movies made in the 1990s, the 
lawyer-hero was a much rarer character, and lawyers were much more often depicted 
as either comic buffoons4 or incompetent or corrupt hired guns selling their services 
to the highest bidder, regardless of ethical concerns.5
 There are undoubtedly a number of causes for this evolution, and pinpointing the 
particular reasons is beyond the scope of this article. However, an interesting 
correlation appears when samples of movies from the middle and end of the twentieth 
century are examined in conjunction with the model code of ethics endorsed by the 
American Bar Association (ABA) in effect at the time those movies were made. 
Specifically, as lawyers in film became less admirable, the ABA’s model codes of 
ethics were likewise becoming less aspirational. For scholars interested in examining 
the portrayal of lawyers in film or the evolution of legal ethics, this correlation 
presents an interesting, new area of study.
 This article is intended to begin an exploration of this correlation. In Part II, 
selected movies from the 1950s and 1960s are compared with the Canons of Legal 
Ethics. In Part III, selected movies from the 1990s are compared with the Model 
Rules of Professional Responsibility. The movies were selected based on the emphasis 
1. See, e.g., Paul Bergman & Michael Asimow, Reel Justice: The Courtroom Goes to the Movies 
(2d ed. 2006); Michael Asimow, Lawyers and Popular Culture: Bad Lawyers in the Movies, 24 Nova L. 
Rev. 533 (2000); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can They Do That? Legal Ethics in Popular Culture: Of 
Characters and Acts, 48 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1305 (2001).
2. The gender-specific noun is appropriate here, as most, if not all, lawyers in movies of the 1950s and 
1960s were male. 
3. See, e.g., Cape Fear (Melville-Talbot Productions 1962); Compulsion (20th Century Fox 1959); 
Judgment at Nuremberg (Roxlom Films Inc. 1961); To Kill a Mockingbird (Universal Pictures 
1962).
4. See, e.g., Liar Liar (Universal Pictures 1997); My Cousin Vinny (20th Century Fox 1992).
5. See, e.g., Cape Fear, supra note 3; Sleepers (Warner Bros. Pictures 1996); The Devil’s Advocate 
(Warner Bros. Pictures 1997).
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of the law and attorneys in the plot, box office performance, and critical acclaim.6 
While the sample size of movies surveyed in this article is limited, the correlation 
between the respectability of the lawyers portrayed in films and the aspirational 
nature of model ethical code in effect at the time is nonetheless clear.7
II.  ThE 1950s and 1960s: thE CanOns Of LEgaL EthiCs and thE hErOiC 
MOViE-LaWyEr
 The ABA established its first code of conduct, called the Canons of Legal Ethics 
(the “Canons”), in 1908. With only a few amendments, the Canons remained in 
place until 1969.8 Prior to the passage of the Canons, some commentators suggested 
that the administration of justice was too contentious. In 1905, for example, President 
Theodore Roosevelt called lawyers “hired cunning” and disparaged them for 
thwarting the public interest in favor of lucrative representations of the wealthy.9 At 
an ABA convention the next year, then-dean of University of Nebraska College of 
Law, Roscoe Pound, advocating for reform, said:
The idea that procedure must of necessity be wholly contentious disfigures 
our judicial administration at every point. . . . It leads counsel to forget that 
they are officers of the court and to deal with the rules of law and procedure 
exactly as the professional football coach deals with the rules of the sport. It 
leads to exertion to “get error into the record” rather than to dispose of the 
controversy finally and upon its merits. It turns witnesses, and especially 
expert witnesses, into partisans pure and simple. It leads to sensational cross-
examination “to affect credit,” which have made the witness stand “the 
slaughterhouse of reputations.” It prevents the trial court from restraining the 
bullying of witnesses and creates a general dislike, if not fear, of the witness 
function which impairs the administration of justice . . . . The effect of our 
exaggerated contentious procedure is not only to irritate parties, witnesses 
and jurors in particular cases, but to give the whole community a false notion 
of the purpose and end of law.10
6. Box office information was received from Variety.com, www.variety.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) 
and World Box Off., www.worldboxoffice.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2011) on October 7, 2002. 
However, according to variety.com, domestic box office totals are not complete prior to 1994. Therefore, 
this study only considered box office information for the films of the 1990s. Critical acclaim was 
measured by the number of Academy Award nominations and wins a film had; this information was 
received from Paul Bergman & Michael Asimow, Reel Justice: The Courtroom Goes to the 
Movies (2d ed. 2006) and from Academy Awards, The Oscars, Introduction, FilmSite.org, http://www.
filmsite.org/oscars.html#history (last visited Mar. 23, 2011).
7. Please note that, although lawyers in movies of the earlier period were not universally admirable, neither 
were lawyers in movies of the later period universally deplorable.
8. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct preface, at ix–x (2009).
9. See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 2395, 2399 
(2003).
10. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 
395 (1906), quoted in John M. Barkett, From Canons to Cannon, in A Century of Legal Ethics: 
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 The preamble of the Canons states that “[t]he future of the Republic, to a great 
extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and unsullied. . . . It cannot be 
so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of the members of our profession 
are such as to merit the approval of all just men.”11 The preamble’s lofty language 
suggests that at least one purpose of the Canons was to combat the “disfiguring” of 
the judicial process to which Pound had referred.12
 From the preamble to the final canon, the Canons emphasize integrity and honor. 
Instead of imposing specific requirements on lawyers, the Canons are infused with 
aspirational language of respect,13 fairness,14 restraint,15 and above all, duty.16 They 
warn lawyers against “unprofessional,” “dishonorable,” or “disreputable” conduct17 
and counsel lawyers to aspire to uphold the honor of the legal profession and act 
according to conscience rather than blindly follow a client’s wishes.18 Even where 
lawyers were advised to avoid particular conduct, the Canons recommended rather 
than proscribed.19 The Canons were thus a kind of honor code rather than a rigid set 
of rules, charging each lawyer to “find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for 
fidelity to private trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and 
loyal citizen.”20
 So many lawyers in the movies of the 1950s and 1960s embodied the Canons’ 
aspirations so perfectly that it is easy to imagine that moviemakers had those ideals 
in mind when creating these characters. There is no evidence filmmakers were 
influenced by the Canons, however, and it is much more likely that the lawyer-hero 
ideal of films produced in this period was due, at least in part, to Hollywood’s 
Production Code of 1930, sometimes referred to as the Hays Code.21 In addition to 
containing numerous rules governing the portrayal of sex, nudity, and the use of 
liquor or harsh language, the Production Code required filmmakers to portray courts 
and law enforcement as just and to refrain from showing sympathy for crime or 
Trial Lawyers and the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics 161, 164–65 (Lawrence J. Fox et 
al. eds., 2009).
11. Canons of Prof’l. Ethics pmbl. (1908).
12. Supra note 10.
13. See, e.g., Canons of Prof’l. Ethics Canons 3, 17, 18 (1908).
14. See, e.g., id. Canons 18, 22.
15. See, e.g., id. Canons 15, 16, 23.
16. See, e.g., id. Canons 1–2, 5–6, 8–9, 11, 21, 28, 30, 32.
17. See, e.g., id. Canons 22–23, 25–28.
18. See, e.g., id. Canons 15–16, 29, 31–32.
19. Compare, e.g., id. Canon 10 (stating that a lawyer “should not” acquire an interest in the subject matter 
of a litigation), with Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.8(a) (2009) (“A lawyer shall not enter into 
a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership . . . interest adverse to a 
client . . . .” (emphasis added)).
20. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 32 (1908). 
21. Bergman & Asimow, supra note 1, at 69–71.
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ridiculing the law.22 These provisions of the Production Code may have influenced 
the portrayal of lawyers in film by encouraging filmmakers to portray professionally 
admirable and morally upright lawyers or, if the filmmakers’ projects featured bad 
lawyers, also showing appropriate punishment.23
 The Production Code had its roots in a 1915 U.S. Supreme Court decision 
holding that motion pictures were not an art form and thus not entitled to the free 
speech protections that other media, such as books, enjoyed.24 As a result, executives 
in the movie industry, seeking to derail state and federal attempts to regulate or 
censor films, formed a trade association25 and implemented the Production Code, 
which required all films shown in U.S. theaters to have the trade association’s 
certificate of approval.26 Although compliance with the Production Code was 
supposedly voluntary, it was strictly enforced for many years, meaning that no film 
could be shown in the United States without trade association approval.27 Enforcement 
began to wane in the 1950s after the Supreme Court held that movies were, in fact, 
entitled to free speech protections,28 and filmmakers and theaters became more 
willing to make and exhibit films without trade association approval.29 Despite the 
reduction in enforcement, the Production Code still influenced films up until 1968, 
when it was replaced by the ratings system that is still in use today.30 However, even 
if filmmakers were not aware of, or influenced by, the Canons, a survey of films from 
the period suggests that, whether moviemakers were aware of the Canons or not, 
their movies’ lawyers tended to abide by the Canons’ ethical guidelines.
 Atticus Finch of 1962’s To Kill a Mockingbird 31 is so nearly the archetype of the 
just and honest lawyer that he could have been emblazoned on the Canons’ cover. 
Finch, a liked and respected small-town lawyer in 1930s Alabama, was defense 
counsel to a black man, Tom Robinson, who was accused of raping Mayella Ewell, a 
white woman.32 Finch’s energetic defense of Robinson calls to mind Canon 4, which 
reminds lawyers who serve as counsel for the indigent to “always exert [their] best 
22. Matt Bynum, The Motion Picture Production Code of 1930 (Hays Code), ArtsReformation.com (Apr. 
12, 2006), http://www.artsreformation.com/a001/hays-code.html.
23. Bergman & Asimow, supra note 1, at 570–71.
24. Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm. of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915), overruled by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. 
Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
25. Then known as Motion Pictures Producers and Distributors Association; now called the Motion Picture 
Association of America. 
26. See Bergman & Asimow, supra note 1, at 69; Bob Mondello, Remembering Hollywood’s Hays Code, 40 Years 
On, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93301189.
27. Mondello, supra note 26.
28. Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495.
29. Mondello, supra note 26.
30. See Bergman & Asimow, supra note 1, at 70.
31. To Kill a Mockingbird, supra note 3.
32. Id.
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efforts in [the client’s] behalf.”33 Finch may have saved his best work on behalf of his 
client for the courtroom, but he also invested his personal time in (and risked his 
own safety for) his client as well, something best demonstrated by his willingness to 
stand guard outside the town jail in order to protect Robinson from a lynch mob.34
 Finch, however, never took his defense of Robinson too far. His cross-examination 
of the prosecution’s witnesses was polite, in accordance with Canon 18, which 
recommended that lawyers “always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness 
and due consideration.”35 Finch also did not allow his zealous representation of 
Robinson to color his interactions with the prosecution, as he continually treated 
opposing counsel with courtesy.36 As Canon 17 advised, Finch did not let any feelings 
he may have had toward opposing counsel influence his conduct or demeanor.37
 While criminal defense was not Finch’s usual work, he brought to his defense the 
“warm zeal” that Canon 15 admonished lawyers to use in the maintenance and 
defense of the client’s rights.38 His closing statement was a moment of soaring oratory, 
pleading for justice on Robinson’s behalf.
Now, gentlemen, in this country, our courts are the great levelers . . . . In our 
courts, all men are created equal. I’m no idealist to believe firmly in the 
integrity of our courts and of our jury system—that’s no ideal to me. That is 
a living, working reality! Now I am confident that you gentlemen will review, 
without passion, the evidence that you have heard, come to a decision and 
restore this man to his family. In the name of God, do your duty. In the name 
of God, believe Tom Robinson.39
 While Finch undoubtedly brought the “warm zeal” to his fight for Robinson that 
the Canons recommended,40 his battle was not for Robinson alone, but for the 
principles of equality and justice, the ability to hold his head up before his family and 
his town—in short, it was a battle for the “honor of his profession” and his own 
“reputation for fidelity . . . as an honest man,” just as the Canons envisioned.41
 It must be noted, however, that Finch does commit at least one serious ethical 
violation, albeit one that goes relatively unnoticed in scholarly commentary on the 
case. Under Canon 32, no lawyer should render “any service or advice involving 
disloyalty to the law whose ministers we are.”42 Yet Finch does exactly that when he 
agrees to cover up the identity of Bob Ewell’s killer in order to protect a local recluse 
33. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 4 (1908).
34. To Kill a Mockingbird, supra note 3, at 1:02:00.
35. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 18 (1908).
36. To Kill a Mockingbird, supra note 3.
37. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 17 (1908); To Kill a Mockingbird, supra note 3.
38. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 15 (1908). 
39. To Kill a Mockingbird, supra note 3, at 1:37:07.
40. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 15 (1908).
41. Id. Canon 32.
42. Id.
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from unwanted publicity as a hero.43 Articles referencing Finch are much more likely 
to describe Finch as a “good, virtuous lawyer,”44 “highly ethical, devoted, and 
talented,”45 or “heroic,”46 rather than to mention this transgression. Even when the 
cover-up is mentioned, scholars are quick to leap to Finch’s defense.47 Perhaps because 
the cover-up was done to protect a helpless hermit, or perhaps because he otherwise 
so perfectly embodies the ideal of an ethical lawyer, it seems Finch can do no wrong 
in the eyes of most of his true-life colleagues.
 While Atticus Finch might be among the more popular movie-lawyers of the 
1960s,48 he was not the only lawyer hero fighting for “[j]ustice, pure and unsullied” 
on the silver screen.49 Defense attorney Jonathan Wilk in 1959’s Compulsion is another 
such character.50 Wilk, hired by the families of two young law students who were 
accused of murder, was not liked by anyone: not his clients, who believed him to be 
intellectually inferior to them; not their families (who were paying for the boys’ 
defense), who refer to Wilk as “that atheist,” “a skeptic who makes a mockery of 
religion,” a charlatan, and a lying drunk; and not the townspeople, who dress up in 
Ku Klux Klan uniforms and burn a cross outside his residence.51 If the townspeople 
sought to terrorize Wilk, however, they failed, as his only response to the burning 
cross was to comment dryly that “it’s much too warm for an open fire” and that he 
was not worried about people whose response to an emotional situation “is to pull a 
sheet over their heads.”52
 At least in his clients’ families’ view, Wilk may not be the man of “highest honor” 
as described in Canon 32, though they do seem to find him to be the lawyer described 
in the Canons’ preamble, a lawyer with motives “such as to merit the approval of all 
just men.”53 He is, as the father of one of the defendants put it, “the best trial lawyer 
in the country, . . . and he’s fought capital punishment all his life.” 54 Wilk was as 
43. To Kill a Mockingbird, supra note 3, at 2:06:00.
44. Lea B. Vaughn, A Few Inconvenient Truths About Michael Crichton’s State of Fear: Lawyers, Causes and 
Science, 20 Seton Hall J. Sports & Ent. L. 49, 69 n.107 (2010).
45. Michael Moffitt, Three Things to Be Against (“Settlement” Not Included), 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1203, 
1236 (2009).
46. See, e.g., Harper Estes, Texas Legal Legends: My Heroes Have Always Been Lawyers, 72 Tex. B.J. 556, 556 
(2009).
47. See, e.g., Bill Haltom, But Seriously Folks: The Trial of Atticus Finch, 45 Tenn. B.J. 34, 35 (2009); Orit 
Kamir, Michael Clayton, Hollywood’s Contemporary Hero-Lawyer: Beyond Outsider Within and Insider 
Without, 42 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 829, 837 (2009).
48. A Westlaw search for “Atticus Finch” in all law reviews and journals, run May 11, 2010, returned 704 
articles; a search with the same parameters for “To Kill a Mockingbird” returned 782. 
49. Canons of Prof’l Ethics pmbl. (1908).
50. Compulsion, supra note 3. 
51. Id. at 1:05:22, 1:14:22.
52. Id. at 1:14:56.
53. Id. at 1:05:22; Canons of Ethics pmbl., Canon 32 (1908). 
54. Compulsion, supra note 3, at 1:05:26.
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unconcerned about his clients’ actual guilt or innocence as he was about their personal 
disdain for him; perhaps even more than Finch, Wilk’s concern was for justice.55 
Believing that his clients had no chance at being found not guilty, he entered guilty 
pleas on their behalf to move the proceeding straight to sentencing (which would be 
handled solely by the judge, rather than a jury) and attempted to save his clients from 
the gallows.56 In his powerful closing statement to the judge, Wilk demands:
Isn’t a lifetime behind prison bars enough for this mad act? Must this great 
public be regaled with a hanging? For the last three weeks I’ve heard nothing 
but the cry of blood in this room . . . . Your Honor, if you hang these boys, 
you turn back to the past. I’m pleading for the future . . . . when we can learn 
that all life is worth saving, and that mercy is the highest attribute of man. 
Yes, I’m pleading for the future. In this court of law, I’m pleading for love.57
 Wilk took to heart Canon 5’s principle that lawyers have the right to defend the 
accused and use all fair and honorable means to present all legal defenses, regardless 
of the lawyer’s opinion on their guilt or innocence.58 Additionally, like Finch, Wilk 
also personified Canon 15’s standard that lawyers owe their “entire devotion to the 
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the 
exertion of his utmost learning and ability.”59
 Ethically speaking, Wilk was not perfect. Under Canon 8, Wilk was “bound to 
give a candid opinion on the merits and probable results” to his clients about the 
trial, and he was permitted to advise his clients to avoid the trial by pleading guilty.60 
However, the decision whether or not to do so was his clients’ decision, not his.61 
Wilk ignored this ethical principle and made the decision on his own, substituting 
his own judgment for that of his clients. He also spoke to the press about the case, in 
violation of Canon 20—although this violation was, if not excusable, at least 
understandable, as Wilk arrived in town to take the case only to discover the 
prosecutor giving a press conference about it. Wilk was a f lawed character, much 
more so than Finch, but the net result is, like Finch, a movie-lawyer embodying 
Canon 32 and its provisions that a lawyer “advances the honor of his profession” 
when he undertakes “exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law.”62 
No doubt Wilk, with his career-long fight against the death penalty on moral 
grounds, would agree he acted out of devotion to public duty.
55. Id. at 1:05:26. 
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 5 (1908). 
59. Id. Canon 15. 
60. Id. Canon 8. 
61. See id. (stating that, whenever the controversy will admit of fair adjustment, the client should be advised 
to avoid or to end the litigation).
62. Id. Canon 32.
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 The character Henry Drummond in 1960’s Inherit the Wind was, like Wilk, more 
interested in a moral cause than in any one individual case.63 Drummond was hired 
to represent Bert Cates, a small-town schoolteacher in the South charged with 
violating state law by teaching the theory of evolution.64 Also like Wilk, Drummond 
was disliked by his own client, who resented his situation and was not shy about 
expressing it; at one point he shouted at a reporter: “To you, I’m a headline! To him 
[Drummond], I’m a cause!”65
 Drummond was indeed involved with Cates’s case out of principle: he saw Cates’s 
case as an opportunity to challenge a state law that, as he put it, circumscribed 
peoples’ right to think.66 He waxed idealistic in court, insisting that “[f]anaticism 
and ignorance is [sic] forever busy and needs feeding.”67 Soon, he said, they would be 
marching backwards to the sixteenth century where bigots burned men for disagreeing 
with the mob.68 Like Finch and Wilk, Drummond embraced the “warm zeal” of 
Canon 15.69
 Drummond’s opposition, Matthew Brady, was more of a central character than 
the opposing counsel in To Kill a Mockingbird or Compulsion and, interestingly, unlike 
many other movie-lawyers of the 1950s and 1960s, he was not portrayed positively.70 
One character described Brady as “the only man I know who can strut sitting down,”71 
and during a direct examination, he browbeat one of his own witnesses until she 
cried.72 Brady clearly took the “warm zeal” prescript of Canon 15 too far.
 Movie-lawyers of the 1950s and 1960s may not have been in perfect compliance 
with the Canons, but they did tend to be virtuous and admirable. Further, their 
conduct was usually consistent with the recommendations of the Canons. Between 
this period and the 1990s, however, the portrayal of lawyers in movies became 
increasingly negative. The contrast between these honorable men of justice and the 
movie-lawyers of the 1990s, as well as the contrast between their levels of compliance 
with ethical codes, is stark.
63. Inherit the Wind (Stanley Kramer Productions 1960). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 15 (1908). 
70. In addition to the films discussed herein, see Count the Hours (RKO Radio Pictures 1953); Witness 
for the Prosecution (Edward Small Productions 1957); The Young Philadelphians (Warner 
Bros. Pictures 1959); Cape Fear, supra note 3; Judgment at Nuremberg, supra note 3. 
71. Inherit the Wind, supra note 63.
72. Id.
970
FroM hero To viLLaiN
III.  ThE 1990s: thE MOdEL COdE Of LEgaL EthiCs and thE dEspiCabLE MOViE-
LaWyEr
 The Canons were superseded by the ABA’s Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility (the “Model Code”) in 1969.73 As the ABA’s Commission on 
Professionalism put it, the message of the Canons “was lofty, but hard to 
enforce. . . . [B]oth more formal disciplinary procedures and more precise statements 
of professional standards were required.”74 The Model Code was in turn replaced by 
the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility (the “Model Rules”) in 1983.75 While 
the Model Rules and the Canons address many of the same topics, such as conflicts 
of interest and setting fees, the Model Rules are, unlike the Canons, a system of 
detailed rules that prescribe certain types of conduct and proscribe others. The ABA 
intended the Model Rules to be more easily understood, followed, and enforced than 
the more aspirational, but less specific, principles of the Canons.76 For example, the 
Canons state only that it is the lawyer’s duty to disclose conflicts to the client, that it 
is “unprofessional” to represent parties with conf licting interests without their 
informed consent, and that lawyers are obligated not to represent parties with adverse 
interests.77 In contrast, the Model Rules specifically define the circumstances under 
which a concurrent conflict of interest will exist, as well as when and under what 
circumstances the lawyer can seek the client’s informed consent to waive the conflict; 
the Model Rules provide over a dozen pages of comments further explaining the 
rules that address conflicts of interest.78
 The ABA believed the Canons—and later the Model Code—needed significant 
revision and updating because of the dramatic changes the legal profession underwent 
in the second half of the twentieth century.79 Indeed, the profession changed radically 
during the second half of the twentieth century. First, the number of practitioners 
increased substantially. In 1960, there were 286,000 people employed in the legal 
profession in the United States.80 By 1999, the profession employed 946,000 people.81 
Second, salaries rose exponentially during that time. In 1953, lawyers starting at 
large, prominent firms could expect to make $4000 per year;82 in 1994, starting 
salaries at large law firms could top $70,000 per year, and reached almost $100,000 
73. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct preface, at x (2009).
74. ABA, Comm’n on Professionalism, Report to the House of Delegates, 112 F.R.D. 243, 258 
(1986) [hereinafter ABA Report on Professionalism]. 
75. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct preface at ix–x (2009).
76. Barkett, supra note 10, at 206 n.141 (citing ABA Report on Professionalism, supra note 74).
77. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 6 (1908).
78. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.7 cmts. 1–35, 1.8 cmts. 1–20 (2009).
79. ABA Report on Professionalism, supra note 74, at 254–55.
80. Lawrence Baum, American Courts: Process and Policy 60 (5th ed. 2001).
81. Id.
82. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big 
Law Firm 24 (1991).
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by the end of the decade.83 Third, large law firms grew and multiplied during the 
second half of the twentieth century.84 This changed the practice of law by 
emphasizing advice over oratory and encouraging lawyers to be primarily business 
advisors instead of courtroom advocates.85 Law firms encouraged different values in 
attorneys; their best attorneys “devote themselves to study of the interests of particular 
clients . . . . Their interest centers wholly in an individual client or set of clients, not 
in the general administration of justice.”86
 These changes in the legal profession, which contributed to the demise of the 
Canons and the implementation of the Model Code, coincidentally overlapped with 
the demise of Hollywood’s Production Code, which was replaced with the modern 
movie rating system in 1968.87 No longer under the restraints of the Production 
Code, moviemakers were free to portray lawyers in whatever way that suited the 
needs of the stories they wished to tell. By the 1990s, lawyers in movies were often 
villains, antiheroes, or the butt of jokes.88 “They tend to be rude, crass, selfish, and 
greedy,” wrote one scholar.89 “If you’re looking for an honest, hard-working lawyer, 
look elsewhere; many of the post-1970 attorneys are unethical, disloyal, or 
incompetent.”90 Because 1990s movie-lawyers are much more likely than their 1950s 
and 1960s counterparts to play a negative character,91 they had no trouble finding 
their way around—or blasting holes right through—the ethical requirements of the 
Model Rules.
 Vincent Gambini in 1992’s My Cousin Vinny is one prominent example of an 
unethical lawyer played for laughs. Gambini was a Brooklyn lawyer who traveled to 
Alabama to defend two young men, one of whom is his cousin, on trial for murder.92 
While much of the comedy derives from Gambini’s initial incompetence and near-
miraculous turnaround, Gambini did commit two egregious ethical violations during 
the course of his representation of the boys.
83. What Do New Lawyers Earn? A 15-Year Retrospective 1994–2008, Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement, 
Inc., http://www.nalp.org/aug09newlawyersal (last visited Feb. 25, 2011).
84. Galanter & Palay, supra note 82, at 46–47.
85. Id. at 5–6.
86. Id. at 6–7.
87. Bergman & Asimow, supra note 1, at 69–70.
88. See, e.g., Cape Fear, supra note 3; The Devil’s Advocate, supra note 5; Sleepers, supra note 5; Liar 
Liar, supra note 4; My Cousin Vinny, supra note 4.
89. Asimow, supra note 1, 576–77.
90. Id. at 577.
91. Compare Liar Liar, supra note 4, My Cousin Vinny, supra note 4, Cape Fear, supra note 3, The 
Devil’s Advocate, supra note 5, Sleepers, supra note 5, and The Firm (Paramount Pictures 1993), 
with To Kill a Mockingbird, supra note 3, Compulsion, supra note 3, and Judgment at Nuremberg, 
supra note 3. See also A Few Good Men (Columbia Pictures 1992) (portraying lawyers as, at best, 
mixed); Philadelphia (TriStar Pictures 1993). 
92. My Cousin Vinny, supra note 4.
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 First, Gambini was not remotely qualified to represent two criminal defendants 
facing the death penalty. Gambini, who passed the bar after his sixth try, was an 
automobile mechanic who planned to specialize in personal injury law and who had 
yet to try a case at all, much less a capital murder case.93 Model Rule 1.1 requires 
lawyers to provide competent representation, which means the lawyer possesses the 
“legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”94 Gambini’s ineptitude caused him to take serious missteps that, if 
taken by a real-life lawyer, could conceivably result in sanctions or disbarment. For 
example, he asked no questions at the arraignment and had no idea he was entitled 
to receive discovery from the prosecution.95
 Gambini was also not admitted to practice in Alabama. But instead of properly 
seeking admission pro hac vice—which he probably did not do because he knew that 
a personal injury lawyer with no trial experience would not be admitted pro hac vice 
for a capital case—he impersonated a prominent New York trial lawyer.96 In so doing, 
he violated both Model Rule 3.3(a), which prohibits lawyers from making false 
statements to the tribunal, and Model Rule 5.5(a), which prohibits the unauthorized 
practice of law.97 Gambini may have genuinely cared for his clients and sought the 
best result for them, but there is no doubt he did so in an unethical and impermissible 
manner.
 Interestingly, however, the Gambini character was in some ways a throwback to 
movie-lawyers of the 1950s and 1960s. He was an “everyman” hero, a down-to-
earth, blue-collar man who happened to be a lawyer, a character reminiscent of 
Atticus Finch and wholly unlike many other 1990s movie-lawyers whose interest in 
the law stemmed from the massive incomes they could earn.98 Gambini was, indeed, 
a hero, despite his egregious ethical violations and total lack of trial experience, 
because he rescued his innocent clients from death row. Like Finch, Gambini is 
hailed as a positive portrayal of lawyers on film, his ethical violations ignored in 
favor of the fair and just outcome he was able to achieve.99
 Unethical behavior was at the forefront of the comedy in 1997’s Liar Liar. In that 
movie, attorney Fletcher Reede found himself suddenly unable to lie after his son’s 
birthday wish—that Reede stop lying—came true, right on the eve of an important 
case that could be won only if Reede and his client, Samantha Cole, lied during the 
trial.100 The film plays on the assumption that lawyers are liars, willing to do or say 
93. Id.
94. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.1 (2009).
95. My Cousin Vinny, supra note 4.
96. Id.
97. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a), 5.5(a) (2009).
98. See, for example, the discussion of Martin Vail, infra notes 108–29 and accompanying text, and the 
discussion of Kevin Lomax, infra notes 131–50 and accompanying text.
99. Bergman & Asimow, supra note 1, at 101, 111.
100. Liar Liar, supra note 4.
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anything to win a case for their clients. However, Reede’s constant lying to his clients 
and to third parties, in court and out of it, violated a number of the Model Rules. 
Reede’s trial strategy was based on convincing his client that her infidelity was not a 
violation of her prenuptial agreement, something he accomplishes in the film.101 
Under Model Rule 3.1, however, lawyers are prohibited from advancing claims or 
defenses with no good-faith basis in law and fact, and Reede’s actions violate this 
rule.102 Reede’s plan to have Cole lie about her infidelity also violated Model Rule 3.3, 
which prohibits lawyers from making false statements to the court or proffering 
evidence they know to be false.103 In fact, simply by knowing that his client intended 
to lie on the stand and failing to take action to prevent her from doing so, Reede 
violated Model Rule 3.3(b).104
 Not only is Reede an inveterate liar, his twenty-four hours of forced truth telling 
failed to elicit a shred of remorse or desire to change. The crisis of conscience he 
suffered at the end of the film occurred not because of his dishonesty, but because his 
client then decided to seek full custody of her children, a situation Reede was facing 
in his personal life.105 Reede expressed no remorse about any ethical breaches, nor 
does the film suggest that he had reformed and was newly committed to honesty. 
When his son asks if Reede can lie again, Reede replied, “Yes, but not to you. I 
always want to be honest with you,” 106 implying Reede will return to his dishonest 
ways when back at work. Reede is arguably as negative a portrayal of an attorney as 
Kevin Lomax in The Devil’s Advocate (discussed later), as both characters act without 
regard for ethical rules, apparently without even minimal knowledge of what 
standards those rules impart and, ultimately, without remorse.
 Lawyers in dramas made during the 1990s were no more ethical than their 
comedic counterparts. Lawyer Martin Vail in 1996’s Primal Fear was a defense 
attorney involved in two cases, the first a civil suit in the process of being settled 
between his client, Joey Pinero, and the city for police brutality, and the second a 
criminal case in which his client, Allen Stampler, was accused of murdering 
Archbishop Rushman.107 Vail was not portrayed as a one-dimensional, wholly 
unpleasant, unlikeable, or unethical character; he was more complex, clearly motivated 
by money and yet still idealistic about his role as an attorney. Although he did 
occasionally abide by the Model Rules, when Vail decided to ignore his ethical 
obligations, he did so without compunction.
 The filmmakers went to extraordinary lengths to emphasize Vail’s income and 
the other characters’ belief that Vail’s primary motivation was money. Vail was shown 
101. Id.
102. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.1 (2009); Liar Liar, supra note 4.
103. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.3(a) (2009).
104. Id. R. 3.3(b).
105. Liar Liar, supra note 4.
106. Id. at 1:18:00.
107. Primal Fear (Paramount Pictures 1996).
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numerous times driving a Mercedes; District Attorney Shaughnessy referred to Vail’s 
“commission” rather than “contingency fee” when discussing settlement of the civil 
suit; and Assistant District Attorney Janet Venable told Vail that she was still working 
at the District Attorney’s office because, as she put it, “I don’t need a Mercedes.”108
 Vail admitted that “the money is nice,” but he did embrace at least some remnants 
of the standards of honor and justice found in the now-defunct Canons, particularly 
Canon 5.109 His true motivation was not pecuniary, but philosophical, rooted in 
constitutional law and ideals of justice. When speaking to a reporter, he explained:
I believe in the notion that people are innocent until proven guilty. I believe 
in that notion because I choose to believe in the basic goodness of people. I 
choose to believe that not all crimes are committed by bad people. And I try 
to understand that some very, very good people do some very bad things.110
Like Wilk in Compulsion, Vail did not care if his clients were guilty or innocent 
because he understood and embraced the principle that everyone deserves a defense.
 Vail did, at least at times, abide by the ethical requirements of the Model Rules. 
He recognized, for instance, that he could not make decisions whether to settle civil 
suits or plea bargain in criminal cases without his client’s consent, in accordance with 
Model Rule 1.2(a).111 Consistent with the requirements of Model Rule 1.3, which 
requires that lawyers act “with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client,”112 Vail and his investigator carefully looked for evidence to support the story 
Stampler offered in his defense. Vail also took Stampler’s case pro bono in accordance 
with the recommendation of Model Rule 6.1(a), which asks lawyers to devote fifty 
hours of legal services per year to people unable to pay or causes primarily devoted to 
meeting the legal services needs of people of limited means.113
 Although Vail never explicitly discussed his motive in taking Stampler’s case pro 
bono, the movie provides hints that his motive was less than honorable. After taking 
the case, Vail mentioned to a reporter that he likes the publicity inherent in his job, 
and Venable suggested that Vail took the case in order to sell the publishing rights.114 
Under Model Rule 1.8(d), Vail is forbidden from negotiating an agreement with 
Stampler that would give Vail media rights to a portrayal of the case prior to the 
conclusion of the representation.115 However, the Model Rules do not prohibit Vail 
from making agreements with media or literary agents for his own story about the 
108. Id. at 00:30:17.
109. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 5 (1908); Primal Fear, supra note 107, at 01:21:14.
110. Primal Fear, supra note 107, at 01:21:18.
111. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2009).
112. Id. R. 1.3(a).
113. Id. R. 6.1(a).
114. Primal Fear, supra note 107.
115. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.8(a), (c) (2009); see Primal Fear, supra 107.
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case, assuming he could do so without violating Model Rule 1.6(a), which requires 
lawyers to keep information about the representation confidential.116
 The Model Rules do not prohibit Vail from taking Stampler’s case even if he was 
primarily or wholly motivated by money or publicity (although under the Canons, 
such conduct would be frowned upon),117 but there are nonetheless numerous other 
ways Vail violated his ethical duties. Although Vail knew he could not accept a 
settlement or plea offer without consulting his client, he apparently was unaware that 
it is also the client’s decision to decide whether to plead not guilty.118 Instead, when 
discussing pleas with Stampler, he told Stampler, “I speak. You do not speak. Your job 
is just to sit there and look innocent.”119 When Stampler insisted that Vail enter a plea 
of not guilty, Vail brushed off his instructions, telling him, “I’ll say whatever I say.”120
 Furthermore, Vail’s “reasonable diligence” on behalf of his client went far beyond 
what the Model Rules permit when he stole a videotape from the crime scene, the 
contents of which showed a possible motive for the Archbishop’s murder.121 Model 
Rule 3.4 prohibits lawyers from obstructing another party’s access to evidence,122 which 
is precisely what Vail did when he stole the tape.123 When he later decided that it would 
be more advantageous for him if the prosecution had the tape and introduced it into 
evidence, Vail had his investigator leave the tape on Venable’s doorstep, and Vail later 
lied to Assistant District Attorney Venable about Vail’s involvement with getting the 
tape to Venable.124 While anonymously delivering the tape is not conduct specifically 
prohibited by the Model Rules, lying about his actions constituted a violation of both 
Model Rule 3.4(a) and Model Rule 4.1, which requires truthfulness in statements to 
non-clients.125 Vail also engaged in ex parte communications with the judge in violation 
of Model Rule 3.5(b), which prohibits such communications, and attempted to provoke 
a violent outburst from his client during the trial, thereby violating Model Rule 3.5(d), 
which prohibits conduct “intended to disrupt a tribunal.”126
 While District Attorney Shaughnessy and Assistant District Attorney Venable 
are not the focus of the movie, the film nonetheless suggests that they, like Vail, 
would ignore ethical obligations when necessary. Shaughnessy, who had been close 
to the murdered Archbishop, insisted for purely personal reasons—vengeance—that 
116. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.6(a) (2009). 
117. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 32 (1908).
118. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.2(a) (2009).
119. Primal Fear, supra note 107, at 00:32:15.
120. Id. at 00:32:46.
121. Id. 
122. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.4(a) (2009).
123. Primal Fear, supra note 107.
124. Id.
125. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 4.1 (2009).
126. Id. R. 3.5(d); Primal Fear, supra note 107.
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Venable seek the death penalty against Stampler before she even reviewed the file.127 
Venable’s acquiescence to Shaughnessy’s instructions suggests a violation of the spirit, 
if not the letter, of Model Rule 3.8, which prohibits prosecutors from knowingly 
prosecuting charges not supported by probable cause.128 Venable, for her part, failed 
to show proper respect for the decorum of the tribunal, in violation of Model Rule 
3.5(d),129 by being continually argumentative and belligerent throughout the trial, 
culminating in a diatribe against Stampler that exemplified the “bullying of witnesses” 
and the description of a witness stand as the “slaughterhouse of reputations” that 
Pound warned against in 1906.130
 However, the most notorious example of the lawyer antihero can be found in 
1997’s The Devil ’s Advocate, in which small-town defense attorney Kevin Lomax 
joined a high-powered New York firm literally run by the devil, as personified in 
attorney John Milton.131 Lomax, enticed by Milton’s job offer, moved to New York to 
pursue the riches and power a large law firm could offer him.132 Lomax and his fellow 
movie-lawyers had no trouble conceptualizing the law as a “mere money-getting 
trade,” against which Canon 12 had cautioned lawyers of the early twentieth century.133 
Lomax admitted he switched from prosecution to defense because defense paid better, 
and, as one of the partner’s wives told Lomax’s wife, “If you’re never going to see your 
husband, you might as well have a relationship with his money.”134 Unlike the Canons, 
the Model Rules do not admonish attorneys against this kind of attitude.
 Throughout the film, Lomax felt free to violate ethical rules with impunity. He 
eavesdropped on jury deliberations, a violation of Model Rules 3.4 and 3.5, which 
require fairness to the opposing party and decorum of the tribunal.135 He knew the 
witness providing a client’s alibi was lying and put her on the stand anyway in violation 
of Model Rule 3.3, which governs candor toward the tribunal.136 His response upon 
learning that Milton was involved in money laundering, selling weapons, and bribing 
judges was, “What . . . do you want? He’s a lawyer!”137 even though such conduct 
violates Model Rule 8.4(b)138 and attorneys are required to report ethical violations 
127. Primal Fear, supra note 107.
128. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 6.8(a) (2009); Primal Fear, supra note 107.
129. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.5(d) (2009). 
130. Barkett, supra note 10, at 164–65 (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395 (1906)).
131. The Devil’s Advocate, supra note 5. 
132. See id.
133. Canons of Prof’l Ethics Canon 12 (1908).
134. The Devil’s Advocate, supra note 5, at 00:57:03.
135. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 3.4, 3.5 (2009).
136. Id. R. 3.3(a)(3). 
137. The Devil’s Advocate, supra note 5, at 1:47:03.
138. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.4(b) (2009) (prohibiting lawyers from “commit[ing] a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects”).
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under Model Rule 8.3.139 Lomax’s job was not to pursue justice. As he saw it, his job 
as a lawyer was to win, no matter what it takes: “I don’t lose!” he shouted at Milton, 
after Milton suggested Lomax could have lost cases instead of using unethical 
tactics.140 “I win! I’m a lawyer! That’s my job! That’s what I do!” 141
 At the end of the film, it is revealed that Lomax’s New York life was a vivid 
hallucination, and Lomax found himself in the courthouse where the movie begins. 
Staring at himself in a bathroom mirror, perhaps debating the ethical implications of 
his choices, Lomax made a critical decision: instead of returning to the courtroom to 
defend his client, a man he knew was guilty of sexually assaulting children, he 
requested to be removed as counsel.142 It is possible that some viewers (particularly 
viewers uncomfortable with the idea that defense lawyers vigorously defend guilty 
clients) interpreted Lomax’s decision as noble, even heroic. However, his decision 
actually revealed yet another ethical failing: Lomax abandoned his client at a critical 
phase of trial. Under Model Rule 1.16(b)(1), “a lawyer may withdraw from representing 
a client if . . . withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the 
interests of the client.”143 Withdrawing during trial—assuming the judge even 
allowed Lomax to do so—would cause substantial delay while the defendant engaged 
new counsel and the new lawyer familiarized himself with the case, postponing the 
defendant’s ability to have his day in court. Furthermore, as the ABA Comment to 
Rule 1.2 states, “Legal representation should not be denied to people who are unable 
to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular 
disapproval.”144 Certainly a child molester’s defense is a controversial cause and 
subject to popular disapproval, but the accused nonetheless deserves a defense.145 By 
withdrawing his representation in the middle of trial, just before he was to cross-
examine an important witness for the prosecution, Lomax placed the effective defense 
of his client in jeopardy and revealed that he had learned nothing from the vision of 
his downfall.
 These movie-lawyers, like many others of the 1990s,146 could hardly be called 
paragons of virtue. If they did not lack competence, as Gambini did,147 they lacked 
scruples, like Reede and Lomax.148 Movies of the early 2000s suggest that this trend 
will only continue, with movie-lawyers like Elle Woods,149 who blundered her way 
139. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 8.3(a) (2009).
140. The Devil’s Advocate, supra note 5, at 2:01:17.
141. Id. at 2:01:20.
142. See id.
143. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.16(b)(1) (2009) (emphasis added).
144. Id. R. 1.2 cmt. 5.
145. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
146. Asimow, supra note 1, 576–77.
147. My Cousin Vinny, supra note 4.
148. Liar Liar, supra note 4; The Devil’s Advocate, supra note 5.
149. Legally Blonde (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 2001). 
978
FroM hero To viLLaiN
into an acquittal for her client in a manner reminiscent of Gambini, and the defense 
lawyers of The Exorcism of Emily Rose, who ineptly failed to develop a trial strategy 
until after the prosecution presented its case.150
iV. COnCLUsiOn
 Because of the adversarial nature of the U.S. legal system, and of litigation in 
particular, it is no surprise that lawyers and courtroom dramas so frequently find 
their way to the big screen. The primary duty of these movie-lawyers is to entertain 
the audience, a concern real-life attorneys rarely, if ever, face. Legal codes of ethics 
need not constrain the activities of movie-lawyers, who may be ethical or not, 
depending on the needs of the stories the filmmakers choose to tell.
 This article explored a sampling of films that featured lawyers and were produced 
in the 1950s and 1960s as well as in the 1990s in order to demonstrate the well-
documented shift151 from the usually admirable, heroic lawyers of the 
mid-twentieth-century movies to the generally unethical, unlikable lawyers of the 
1990s. Comparing the films with the model codes of ethics endorsed by the ABA at 
the time the movies were made demonstrates an interesting correlation between the 
two. That is, the ABA’s aspirational Canons were in effect at a time movie-lawyers 
were usually portrayed positively and as ethical attorneys; but as the ABA abandoned 
the Canons for more specific and technical ethical rules, movie-lawyers became less 
likable and less ethical.
 While there is no doubt that a variety of factors have influenced the evolution of 
both the portrayal of lawyers in movies and the model codes of ethics endorsed by 
the ABA, and while it is unlikely that one evolution had a direct influence on the 
other, the simultaneous evolutionary shifts over time present an interesting and, as 
yet, largely unexplored area of study for legal scholars and sociologists interested in 
the portrayal of the profession and the profession’s evolving ethical responsibilities.
150. The Exorcism of Emily Rose (Screen Gems 2005).
151. See, e.g., Bergman & Asimow, supra note 1; Asimow, supra note 1; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 1.
